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Abstract
The assumption that action and perception can be investigated
independently is entrenched in theories, models and exper-
imental approaches across the brain and mind sciences. In
cognitive science, this has been a central point of contention
between computationalist and 4Es (enactive, embodied, ex-
tended and embedded) theories of cognition, with the former
embracing the “classical sandwich”, modular, architecture of
the mind and the latter actively denying this separation can be
made. In this work we suggest that the modular independence
of action and perception strongly resonates with the separa-
tion principle of control theory and furthermore that this prin-
ciple provides formal criteria within which to evaluate the im-
plications of the modularity of action and perception. We will
also see that real-time feedback with the environment, often
considered necessary for the definition of 4Es ideas, is not
however a sufficient condition to avoid the “classical sand-
wich”. Finally, we argue that an emerging framework in the
cognitive and brain sciences, active inference, extends ideas
derived from control theory to the study of biological sys-
tems while disposing of the separation principle, describing
non-modular models of behaviour strongly aligned with 4Es
theories of cognition.
Introduction
Can perception and action be studied as separate pro-
cesses?
In cognitive science, the hypothesis that the mind is mod-
ular originated with Fodor’s work (Fodor, 1983), formalis-
ing the idea that the perceptual and motor systems should
be considered as separate and informationally encapsulated
components of an organism that sit at its periphery. This
view has then more recently been recapitulated by the so-
called “classical sandwich” architecture of cognitive sys-
tems, whereby cognition sits in between perception and ac-
tion, effectively rendering them almost autonomous (Hur-
ley, 2001). This view contrasts with 4Es (enactive, embod-
ied, embedded and extended) theories of the mind suggest-
ing that real-time feedback interactions with the environ-
ment are crucial to explain cognitive processes. In doing
so, 4Es proposals reject the hypothesis of segregated per-
ceptual and motor components (Clark, 1998; Wilson, 2002;
Beer and Williams, 2015; Di Paolo et al., 2017), now seen as
strongly and reciprocally coupled by feedback mechanisms
mediated by the environment.
In this work we argue, however, that the presence of feed-
back is not enough to reject the classical sandwich architec-
ture. We will see that the modular view can still implicitly
survive in modern studies of action and perception even in
the presence of closed sensorimotor loops. To ground this
argument and related discussions on Fodor’s modularity, we
use formal frameworks that have emerged from control the-
ory, already widely exploited in modern theories of percep-
tion and action based on processes of estimation/inference
and control (Rao and Ballard, 1999; Todorov, 2004; Fris-
ton, 2010, 2011). Perception, on this view, is modelled as
a process of estimation of the hidden or latent states of the
world given noisy and often inaccurate observations. Ac-
tion, on the other hand, is accounted for with theories of op-
timal control, suggesting possible optimality principles for
the implementation of motor actions and behaviour more in
general. In this light, we then argue that the so-called sepa-
ration principle of estimation and control in control theory
provides concrete grounding of Fodor’s modularity with re-
gards to action and perception. After presenting this prin-
ciple and its connections to the idea of modularity, we will
discuss its weaknesses for the study of cognitive and natural
systems. We finally propose active inference (Friston et al.,
2010; Friston, 2010) as an alternative view openly reject-
ing the separation principle, thus supporting non-modular
4Es arguments, while maintaining its roots in modern ap-
proaches to action and perception based on control theory.
Perception and action in cognitive science
The classical sandwich
A classical idealisation of perception holds that it is a
bottom-up or feed-forward process with the primary goal
of receiving information through the senses in order to
build internal representations of the surrounding environ-
ment (Marr, 1982). Cognition, including thinking, planning,
etc., is cast as a process of manipulating the information
within these internal representations and action as a process
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of deriving appropriate motor commands based on the out-
comes of those manipulations. This sequential architecture
of perception-cognition-action is best captured by the idea of
the “classical sandwich” (Hurley, 2001). On this view, per-
ceptual and motor processes work relatively independently,
separated by cognitive manipulations at their centre. This
notion of separation has its roots in Fodor’s idea of the mod-
ular mind (Fodor, 1983). Fodor saw the more traditional
notion of cognition, the filling, representing functions such
as memory, problem solving, deduction and induction, as
strictly non-modular. However, his argument for periph-
eral processing, input interfaces (i.e. perception) and out-
put layers (i.e. motor control, action), is that these compo-
nents should be seen as separate modules. Modules have
only restricted access to higher order information and vice
versa, and their information content is encapsulated, limited
and specific to each module. According to this view then,
expectations, beliefs and desires also cannot affect in partic-
ular perceptual systems (Fodor, 1983; Barrett and Kurzban,
2006) (although we note that the exact meaning of Fodor’s
idea is still debated, Coltheart (1999); Barrett and Kurzban
(2006)).
The 4Es view
In contrast, enactive, embodied, extended and embedded
theories of cognitive science, often just addressed as 4Es,
challenge several of the intuitions behind computational ac-
counts of cognitive science, including the sequential and
modular nature of perception, cognition and action proposed
with the classical sandwich (Varela et al., 1991; Clark, 1998;
Wilson, 2002; Beer and Williams, 2015). 4Es theories cover
a large set of heterogeneous ideas with some of the more
general points including the importance of fast-paced, dy-
namic interactions with the environment over internal com-
putations and the role played by the body in this dynamical
process. The dynamic nature of real-time interactions of an
agent with its environment leads then to a non-sequential,
non-encapsulated interpretation of perception and action,
best represented as a causally circular (i.e. closed) process
whose components are not clearly separable. This last idea
is the point of contention we focus on in this work. We
claim, in fact, that even in closed-loop frameworks includ-
ing feedback mechanisms, the often implicit assumption is
that perception and action can still be treated separately (for
counterexamples see for instance Beer (2003); Iizuka and
Ikegami (2004); Harvey et al. (2005); Di Paolo and Iizuka
(2008)). This becomes especially clear in the literature fo-
cused on notions of optimal control, whereby definitions of
optimality often include assumptions regarding the separa-
tion of perceptual and motor components within a system. In
the next section we will see how concepts from control the-
ory, estimation, optimal control and in particular the separa-
tion principle, can explain this apparent paradox (i.e. closed-
loop but nonetheless optimally separable).
Perception and action in control theory
Perception as inference (estimation)
In control theory, the idea of estimation first emerged with
the contributions of Kolmogorov and Wiener (Sorenson,
1970) and the popularisation of Kalman filters (Kalman,
1960), although estimation theory itself can be traced back
to Gauss and his method of least squares (Sorenson, 1970).
The main goal of estimation is to infer (or estimate) hidden
parameters, states and inputs of system given only a set of
observations that are in general noisy, and a model of the un-
derlying dynamics that may also include noise/uncertainty.
More recently, these ideas have re-emerged in the con-
text of studies of perception as inference with the so-called
“Bayesian brain hypothesis” and related theories of pre-
dictive coding and free energy minimisation (Knill and
Richards, 1996; Rao and Ballard, 1999; Knill and Pouget,
2004; Friston, 2010; Hohwy, 2013; Clark, 2015b; Buckley
et al., 2017). On this view, organisms operate in an uncer-
tain world, with noisy sensors that provide only incomplete
and often ambiguous information. Agents are depicted as
Bayesian inference machines that estimate the latent states
and causes of their sensory input via the update of a gen-
erative model of such input. These agents operate by gen-
erating top-down predictions of their sensory data and by
continuously updating these prediction to minimise their dif-
ference to incoming sensory data (prediction errors). Once
prediction errors are minimised, they converge to the best
explanation, or inference, of the causes of their sensory data.
In control theory, this process of inference is often defined
as “estimation” or “filtering” (Jazwinski, 2007; A˚stro¨m and
Murray, 2010; A˚stro¨m, 2012) and is usually performed by an
“estimator”. In the literature, an estimator is sometimes con-
sidered to include a forward model, or predictor (Todorov,
2006), in other instances to work alongside one (see discus-
sion in Friston (2011)). In our work we will consider an
estimator-predictor pair as simply an estimator.
Action as control
Modern optimal control theory originated in 1950-60’s with
formalisations by Pontryagin (Pontryagin et al., 1962) and
Bellman (Bellman, 1957). Connections to classical me-
chanics and to work by Hamilton and Jacobi among oth-
ers (Todorov, 2006; Sussmann and Willems, 1997) however
place its historical inception a few centuries earlier. Opti-
mal control defines the problem of finding a policy (i.e. a
sequence of actions) for a given system that optimises a cri-
terion describing a certain goal for the system.
In the last few decades, optimal control has also emerged
as a dominant theory of action, motor control and behaviour
in neuroscience (Kawato, 1999; Wolpert and Ghahramani,
2000; Todorov, 2004; Ko¨rding and Wolpert, 2006; Ko¨rding,
2007; Franklin and Wolpert, 2011). On this view, organ-
isms minimise, over time, a cost function (i.e. the optimal-
ity criterion) representing a measure of performance for the
achievement of a certain goal. For instance, smooth reaching
hand movements can be explained by the minimisation of a
cost function based on the rate of change of acceleration, or
jerk, of hand movements (Franklin and Wolpert, 2011).
Different cost functions lead to different possible control
policies (i.e. sequences of actions) towards a goal. One of
the most fundamental distinctions between classes of cost
functions is based on the absence/presence of real-time feed-
back from the environment, defining open and closed-loop
control respectively (Todorov, 2004; A˚stro¨m and Murray,
2010). Open-loop control methods rely on complex internal
models that accurately mimic the external dynamics simu-
lating also the effects of feedback, and allow for pure inter-
nal feed-forward planning. Perceptual processes model the
transduction of sensory input into some internal neural rep-
resentation and are often represented as estimators (Todorov,
2004) and/or forward models-estimators pairs (Wolpert and
Kawato, 1998). On the other hand, action corresponds to
the motor output produced by such representations and is
usually portrayed as a controller (Todorov, 2004) or inverse
model (Wolpert and Kawato, 1998; Kawato, 1999). The se-
quential nature of estimation-modelling (planning)-control
is consistent with the traditional classical sandwich of cog-
nitive science, where estimation and control are processes
encapsulated into separate modules used in sequential or-
der and the effects of feedback from the environment are
though to be slow enough to be successfully modelled inter-
nally. Closed-loop control is based on the same architecture
as the open-loop case (i.e. estimators and controllers) but
includes, in contrast, fast-paced feedback from the environ-
ment. This allows such framework to tackle more elegantly
different sources of noise, delays, internal fluctuations and
uncertainties (Todorov, 2004). Closed-loop control appears
to be closer to 4E views with the presence of a real-time
feedback mechanism that highlights the dynamic interac-
tions of a system with its environment and the impossibility
to capture it internally. We however argue that the most com-
mon implementations of closed-loop optimal control are still
more consistent with the more traditional, sequential, view
of action and perception mainly due to ideas based on the
separation principle. The vast majority of examples where
this sequential view is not explicitly taken, in fact, often in-
clude closed-loop control without a specific notion of opti-
mality (Beer, 2003; Iizuka and Ikegami, 2004; Harvey et al.,
2005; Di Paolo and Iizuka, 2008).
The separation principle
The separation principle of control theory provides a set
of necessary and sufficient conditions under which an op-
timal controller can be constructed by combining indepen-
dent designs for an optimal estimator and an optimal con-
troller (Wonham, 1968; A˚stro¨m and Murray, 2010; Geor-
giou and Lindquist, 2013). This methodology is widely
adopted in control theory and can be used to build con-
trollers for noisy and uncertain systems where environmen-
tal states are only partially observed. Separating estimation
and control is practically desirable because it becomes then
possible to optimally solve the estimation problem and sub-
sequently use the output estimate to build an optimal con-
troller. Typical designs utilise Kalman filters (estimators)
and LQR (Linear Quadratic Regulator) controllers (A˚stro¨m
and Murray, 2010). The idea of the separation theorem is
also very closely related to the certainty equivalence prin-
ciple described in econometrics (Simon, 1956; Theil, 1957;
Bar-Shalom and Tse, 1974; A˚stro¨m, 2012).
The separation principle rests on several assumptions
which can be summarised by (Kappen, 2011; A˚stro¨m,
2012):
• linear process dynamics and observation laws describing
the environment and its latent variables
• Gaussian noise in both process and measurement equa-
tions/laws
• known (co)variance matrices representing uncertainty of
both process and measurement noises
• quadratic cost function used to measure the performance
of a system
• known inputs for the estimator, meaning that the estima-
tor needs to have access to all the variables, external and
internal ones, affecting the inference process.
The restrictive nature of these requirements has been widely
debated in the control theory literature (A˚stro¨m and Murray,
2010; A˚stro¨m, 2012). However, here we discuss on their
possible meaning for the study of cognition with a focus
on biological systems, extending some previous critiques
(Simpkins et al., 2008; Ponto´n et al., 2016). It is imme-
diately clear it would be hard to argue for the plausibility
of these assumptions for biological systems. Living organ-
isms are highly nonlinear and the environments they oper-
ate within are also themselves highly nonlinear, thus they
cannot be fully understood with systems of linear equations.
There is no direct evidence for fluctuations in physical sys-
tems to be accurately described by Gaussian random vari-
ables, and whether biological system could effectively keep
an updated estimate of the uncertainty in environmental vari-
ables (represented by covariance matrices in control theory)
is also unclear (A˚stro¨m and Murray, 2010). It is then not
clear if it is possible to accurately describe important bio-
logical phenomena with quadratic cost functions (Franklin
and Wolpert, 2011). Lastly, the separation principle sug-
gests that sensory systems must have access to an accurate
copy of outgoing motor commands. Specifically, as shown
in Fig. 1, under this scheme the estimator and the controller
exchange information in two ways. The estimator relays ac-
curate estimates of world variables to the controller, which
in turn sends a copy of the motor command back to the esti-
mator. This copy of the motor command is crucial to allow
the sensory system to discount sensory consequences of mo-
tor actions. In the absence of this information, estimates of
world variables quickly become imprecise and subsequently
controls become unstable (Friston, 2011). This notion of a
copy of motor signals is consistent with the classical idea of
efference copy in neuroscience (von Holst and Mittelstaedt,
1950; Crapse and Sommer, 2008; Straka et al., 2018), whose
exact definition and plausibility in neural system have been
comprehensively challenged (Feldman, 2009; Friston, 2011;
Feldman, 2016).
While the separation principle may not strictly hold, one
could argue for a weaker version of separability/modularity.
Systems could be cast as “approximately” or “partially” sep-
arable, with such notions still useful metaphors to under-
stand perception and action as separate modules even with-
out optimality as defined by the separation principle. This
is especially true for the first four criteria of the separation
principle that we listed. For instance, it may be possible
to approximate nonlinear descriptions of a system with lin-
earisations around relevant points/equilibria or to estimate
covariance matrices that although not optimal, closely re-
semble the uncertainty of a process. On the other hand, we
argue that a notion of “approximate” separability is not well
defined for the last of the requirements of the separation
principle and thus will be the focus of our analysis on the
role of this principle in cognitive science. The fact that the
estimator needs have information about motor actions of the
environment is often not considered a problem in standard
control theory and robotics: a copy of motor signals can
easily be retrieved and sent back to the estimator/forward
model (Kawato, 1999). In biology and neuroscience, how-
ever, while the presence of information flowing from mo-
tor to sensory areas has been established for decades in the
form of efference copy/corollary discharge (Cullen, 2004;
Crapse and Sommer, 2008; Straka et al., 2018), recent dis-
cussions on the information contents of such mechanisms
(Feldman, 2009; Friston, 2011; Feldman, 2016) lead us to
carefully consider frameworks based on these ideas and their
role in the cognitive and natural sciences. An alternative ap-
proach, disposing with the need of a copy of motor signals,
is proposed with active inference. In active inference this
need is bypassed using a more powerful forward or gener-
ative model and trivial sensorimotor mappings in place of
complex inverse models/controllers (see Fig. 2), as we shall
see in the next section.
Perception and action in active inference
The Free Energy Principle (FEP) is one of the most ambi-
tious attempts to date of unifying several aspects of our un-
derstanding of biological systems into a single theory de-
scribing such systems in terms of the minimisation of a sin-
gle quantity: information surprisal (Friston, 2010; Clark,
Estimator/
forward 
model
Estimated
sensations Controller
Motor signal
copy
Sensations 
Motor
signal
Plant/
environment
Action and perception in the separation principle
Figure 1: A typical control architecture obeying the sep-
aration principle. An estimator, or forward model, infers
the causes of incoming sensory input which are relayed to
the controller. The controller calculates the optimal output
motor signal based on these estimates and allows the system
to act on the environment. In parallel, the controller sends
also a copy of the command to the estimator, allowing the
latter to take this command into account during the estima-
tion of observed stimuli and discount the effects of internally
generated actions.
2013; Hohwy, 2013; Clark, 2015b; Buckley et al., 2017).
Surprisal is the negative log-probability of an outcome and
for biological systems it is thought to measure the fitness
of an organism to specific states, e.g. for a fish, states in
the water have low surprisal, and are more valuable than
states outside of the water, having high surprisal. Predic-
tive coding and active inference are amongst the most pop-
ular approaches derived from the FEP, and constitute pro-
cess theories proposing how surprisal minimisation could
be implemented in living systems. Predictive coding was
introduced as a functional model of the visual cortex (Rao
and Ballard, 1999) and then shown to be (computationally)
a special case of the FEP (Friston, 2010). It effectively im-
plements ideas related to the Bayesian brain hypothesis dis-
cussed in previous sections, suggesting that perception is as
a process of Bayesian inference and that organisms “per-
ceive” the world by minimising prediction errors measur-
ing the difference between internally generated predictions
of external stimuli and actually sensed ones. Active infer-
ence (Friston et al., 2010; Friston, 2010) extends predictive
coding proposals to the more general realm of action and
behaviour. On this view, organisms are not only trying to
correct mismatch errors via internal updates of a generative
model and its predictions, but also act in the world in order
to generate sensations that are better described by existing
predictions. Similarly to cybernetics (Wiener, 1961; Ashby,
1957), active inference attempts to connect methods from in-
formation and control theory (Variational Bayes and optimal
control respectively) to the study of cognition and biology,
using empirical evidence to constrain complex theoretical
problems (Seth, 2014).
One of the main goals of the FEP is to create a gen-
eral theory of life and mind, unifying existing knowledge in
different fields including thermodynamics, natural sciences,
information and control theory (Friston, 2010, 2011, 2012,
2013). Its position with regards to debates in cognitive sci-
ence is, however, still unclear. The FEP is often thought to
align with more traditional views of cognition, deeply repre-
sentationalist/computationalist (Froese and Ikegami, 2013;
Gładziejewski, 2016). Part of the cognitive science com-
munity sees this as a possible advantage (Hohwy, 2013)
while others as its main drawback (Gładziejewski, 2016; Za-
havi, 2017). Others have argued it is more consistent with
a 4Es perspectives of cognition, claiming that the strengths
of the FEP reside in generative models with no explicit rep-
resentational features (Bruineberg et al., 2018). A different
perspective highlights the potential of the FEP for the for-
malisation of “action-oriented” views of cognition (Engel
et al., 2016; Clark, 2015a,b; Allen and Friston, 2016; Pez-
zulo et al., 2017), re-conciliating traditional views and 4Es
theories. In our work we argue that one of the hypotheses
expressed by active inference openly rejects one of the re-
quirements of the separation principle that we claim strongly
resonates with the ideas of sensory/motor modularity in tra-
ditional views of cognitive science. We thus hold that active
inference aligns with at least some views from 4Es theo-
ries cognition, in particular with the idea of perception and
action as deeply entangled functions of embodied and situ-
ated agents (Clark, 1998; Wilson, 2002; Beer and Williams,
2015; Di Paolo et al., 2017).
Action and perception are not separable
The active inference framework claims that perfect knowl-
edge of one’s motor signals is not necessary in models of
control and estimation (and possibly not at all present in
biological systems, Friston (2011)). The proposed alterna-
tive entails recasting motor control problems into perceptual
or inference problems, considering that these two classes
of problems can be solved by the same algorithms (Attias,
2003; Todorov, 2008; Friston, 2011). According to this in-
terpretation, perception and action are largely overlapping
processes sharing most of their computation, with differ-
ences arising mainly at a physiological level. In active in-
ference, the problem of finding actions is essentially con-
verted to an inference problem, solved by the same underly-
ing predictive coding scheme already in charge of perceptual
processes. More specifically, in this architecture, proprio-
ceptive sensations are also predicted by an agent, alongside
exteroceptive and interoceptive ones (not shown for simplic-
ity in this figure). Explicit motor output is then produced
by simple sensorimotor mappings implemented at the very
periphery of a system and translating proprioceptive predic-
tions into actions for the external world (Friston et al., 2010).
Conceptually, active inference disposes with the need of a
copy of motor signals proposing a more general predictive
coding scheme coupled to simple sensorimotor mappings
translating proprioceptive predictions into actual actions.
In active inference, the more traditional, sequential and
modular role of perception and action advocated by the sep-
aration principle is thus questioned, suggesting that these
functions are deeply intertwined (Friston, 2011; Pickering
and Clark, 2014; Engel et al., 2016; Wiese, 2016; Pezzulo
et al., 2017). In support of this idea and following our own
argument on the parallelism between Fodor’s idea of mod-
ularity and the separation principle of control theory, we
claim that active inference does not meet the requirements
for the separation of estimation and control (perception and
action). Furthermore, it is engaging in an explicitly non-
modular architecture of cognitive processing. We argue, in
fact, that while the first four requirements of the separation
principle expressed earlier may be prone to arguments re-
garding separation in at least some approximate sense (e.g.
an approximately linear model, noise that is approximately
Gaussian, etc.), the presence of a copy of motor signals is ei-
ther present or not, with no room for approximation. In this
sense, the separation of estimation and control is also either
present or not. Active inference models explicitly eschew
the idea that a copy of motor signals is sent to estimators
(Friston, 2011), an idea strictly necessary for classical mo-
tor control architectures based on the separation principle.
Without a copy of motor signals, the architecture described
by the separation principle is unavoidably broken and thus,
according to our initial claim regarding the cognitive sci-
ences, Fodor’s modularity cannot be implemented in result-
ing models of active inference, with action and perception
intimately entangled in a non-modular way, only namely
“separated” for a definition more consistent with traditional
views of cognitive science.
Discussion and Conclusions
In this work we have made an attempt to explicitly con-
nect the idea of modularity in cognitive science to mathe-
matical frameworks of control theory. Specifically, we have
proposed that the idea of “modularity” a` la Fodor (Fodor,
1983), central to architectures such as the classical sandwich
of cognitive science (Coltheart, 1999; Hurley, 2001; Bar-
rett and Kurzban, 2006), can be usefully formalised using
the separation principle of control theory (Wonham, 1968;
A˚stro¨m and Murray, 2010; Georgiou and Lindquist, 2013).
In the classical sandwich view, perception and action are
seen as modules of a feed-forward-only architecture that
are explicitly separated by cognition, the sandwich’s “fill-
ing” (Hurley, 2001). Traditional views of cognitive science
openly embrace this architecture and the idea of modular-
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errors
Generative
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Action and perception in active inference
Figure 2: A control architecture based on active infer-
ence. Active inference converts the complex problem of
optimal control into a more viable problem of inference,
solved by a more general generative model (Friston, 2011).
The forward, or generative, model produces estimates of the
sensory input. The mismatch between these estimates and
real sensory data (here represented as only proprioceptive
but more in general including also exteroceptive and intero-
ceptive) generates prediction errors that are used to update
the generative model itself and thus infer the causes of sen-
sory data when they are minimised. Propriocetive prediction
errors are also explicitly minimised via simple reflex mech-
anisms implemented at the level of peripheral “controllers”.
These controllers receive information in an intrinsic frame of
reference, proprioceptive signals within an agent, and trans-
late them into controls in an extrinsic one, motor actions in
the world, using hardwired sensorimotor mappings (Friston
et al., 2010).
ity of perception and action while 4Es (enactive, embodied,
embedded, extended) theories largely reject them claiming
that fast-paced dynamic interactions between an agent and
its environment imply that perception and action are deeply
entangled and therefore not modular since such dynamics
cannot be internally modelled (Varela et al., 1991; Clark,
1998; Wilson, 2002; Di Paolo et al., 2017).
To ground the debate arising from these contrasting views,
we have then proposed to use control theory, following
a general trend in the fields of cognitive science, neuro-
science and psychology to adopt theories of estimation and
control to explain perception and action respectively (Knill
and Richards, 1996; Rao and Ballard, 1999; Kawato, 1999;
Todorov, 2004; Franklin and Wolpert, 2011). All these
proposals, however, suggest that these two processes can
be treated separately, even when the presence of feedback
mechanisms would suggest otherwise. In particular, we
claimed that the closed-loop optimal control models largely
used in the literature nowadays are often implicitly based
on the “separation principle” of control theory, with most of
the exceptions in work not mentioning explicitly optimality
(e.g. Harvey et al. (2005); Di Paolo and Iizuka (2008)). This
principle defines the conditions whereby a separation of es-
timation (perception) and control (action) of a system is not
only possible, but optimal according to a list of criteria.
We have then claimed that such a separation principle is
consistent with the idea of modularity expressed by Fodor,
based on the information encapsulation argument (Fodor,
1983; Coltheart, 1999). Even if the concept of modular-
ity itself is often considered vague (Coltheart, 1999; Bar-
rett and Kurzban, 2006) (and Fodor himself defining modu-
larity only “to some interesting extent”, Fodor (1983)), we
believe that information encapsulation (Fodor, 1983; Colt-
heart, 1999) should be considered a necessary requirement
for modularity. Such encapsulation defines two basic condi-
tions for the existence of a module: (1) restricted access to
higher order information and vice versa, and (2) information
content limited and specific to each module, both in agree-
ment with the separation principle.
The definition of separation implied by the separation
principle in control theory is on the other hand extremely
strict and allows for, we suggest, deeper discussions regard-
ing the idea of modularity. More in detail, this principle can
be applied only to a small subset of systems (linear, with
Gaussian noise, quadratic cost functions, known covariances
and known inputs). It is thus hard to imagine, on this view,
how studies of brains and minds could make such assump-
tions, suggesting then that non-modular 4Es views provide
a more suitable framework for investigating cognitive and
natural systems. We then argued in favour of a recent pro-
posal based on theories of estimation/inference and control
and with no explicit assumption regarding their separability:
active inference. In this framework, one of the five necessary
requirements for separability, the idea of having access to all
inputs and in particular to a copy of motor signals for per-
ceptual systems, is dismissed (Friston et al., 2010; Friston,
2011). By rejecting such mechanism, active inference effec-
tively challenges classical architectures based on the separa-
tion principle and in doing so, we claimed, explicitly agrees
with 4Es views of cognition whereby perception and action
are seen as non-modular processes. Our work provides thus
support for hypotheses highlighting how active inference is
more in agreement with 4Es theories than with traditional
accounts of cognition (Clark, 2015b; Bruineberg et al., 2018;
Pezzulo et al., 2017).
In the future, we will focus on a mathematical treatment
of the ideas presented in this manuscript, explicitly high-
lighting the differences between architectures inspired by
the separation principle and proposals more in line with 4Es
theories, such as active inference. In doing so, we will
also attempt to operationalise our claims regarding biolog-
ical systems, providing concrete criteria and proposing ex-
perimental setups to test our hypotheses (e.g. regarding ef-
ference copy/corollary discharge), to disambiguate modular-
ity in living organisms. Another potential contribution will
include a deeper analysis regarding aspects of the free en-
ergy principle/active inference that still cast doubts on its
adherence to 4Es theories. For instance, on the role of the
brain as a detached system in a internal/external dichotomy
(Froese and Ikegami, 2013) or more in general the necessity
of markov blankets (Friston, 2013) for the separation of in-
ternal (agent) and external (environment) states that may, al-
most naturally, introduce the idea of mental representations
(Allen and Friston, 2016).
Finally, to quote Kalman on an early intuition regarding
the problem of simultaneous estimation and control (percep-
tion and action in our interpretation):
One may separate the problem of physical realization
into two stages: computation of the best approximation
xˆ(t1) of the state from knowledge of y(t) for t ≤ t1 and
computation of u(t1) given xˆ(t1).
(Kalman et al., 1960)
This may true for engineering but perhaps not for studies of
cognition and natural systems.
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